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Abstract
The criminal law frameworks of countries that have been the subject of interna-
tional peacekeeping operations and military interventions often reveal an urgent
requirement for reform. The promotion of fair and effective justice systems, the
rule of law and transition from conflict to peace frequently necessitates the intro-
duction of new state legislation. Legal transplants have been employed as a legisla-
tive tool to bring about post-conflict legal change. However, the use of transplanted
law in these situations has been controversial and has raised concerns about the jus-
tification for adopting it. This paper examines the justification for employing legal
transplants to develop new post-conflict criminal laws by assessing their practical
utility and the motivational rationale for employing them. It reviews theoretical
perspectives on transplant feasibility and reflects on the experience of previous
criminal law legal transplants. The article concludes by proposing an evaluative
test for prior application to post-conflict criminal legal transplants to assess their
prospects of success and to gauge the necessity for later change and adaptation.
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1 Introduction
The legal frameworks of countries seeking to transition from conflict to peace
are often subject to extensive reform following international intervention. The
United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNTAET ), for example,
passed 71 legal regulations during its four year mandate.1 In Kosovo, 257
regulations were passed between 1999 and 2004,2 and in Afghanistan 188 new
laws were enacted between 2003 and 2007.3 Many of these new laws were
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introduced in order to improve local criminal legislation and facilitate the
development of functioning criminal justice systems, regarded as central to
post-conflict rule of law development.4 The intent, according to the United
Nations (UN ), is that these systems should be equipped with operational courts,
police, prosecution, judiciary and defence services, supported by government
ministries and guided by procedural and substantive legislation.5 Achieving
this ideal, however, presents an immense challenge in post-intervention states.
The infrastructure and institutions necessary for the implementation of criminal
justice are frequently damaged and limited in capacity.6 Existing domestic law,
according to the UN, `often show accumulated signs of neglect and political
distortion, contain discriminatory elements and rarely reflect the requirements
of international human rights and criminal law standards.'7 The experience of
criminal justice in states attempting to emerge from conflict is that domestic
substantive and procedural law may fall short of sufficiently criminalising
activities, allowing them to be committed with impunity and resulting in a
weakening of efforts to establish the rule of law. In Angola, money laundering
and corruption became endemic because they were not recognised as a criminal
activity in any domestic law.8 Similarly, until the legal framework was amended
by the special representative of the Secretary-General in 1999, kidnapping had
been a common occurrence in Kosovo as the Kosovo Criminal Code failed to
define it as an offence.9 In Afghanistan, poppy cultivation increased from 200 to
3,400 metric tons in the year following the removal of the Taliban from power
in 2001. By 2003, the opium economy was valued at an estimated $2.2 billion
and it was financing destabilising armed factions. This prompted the passage of a
Counter Narcotics Law10 (CNL) in the drive to establish an `anti-drugs legislative
4
According to the UN, the rule of law `requires the protection of effective criminal
justice measures': ECOSOC Res 2005/21; UNODC, The Criminal Justice Assessment
Toolkit (2006). Available at: <http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-
reform/cjat_eng/CJAT_Toolkit_full_version.pdf> [accessed 23 April 2014]
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system that meets international standards'.11
The frequent necessity for new criminal law in post-conflict states has
resulted in a huge expansion of international interest and involvement in
programmes designed to promote legal change through legislative reform in
these environments.12 In addition to the UN, foreign assistance agencies
such as the United Kingdom's Department for International Development and
Germany's Agency for Technical Assistance have provided technical support
for legislative drafting programmes in transitional states. Similar initiatives
have been undertaken by non-governmental organisations such as the American
Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI),
the International Development Law Organisation and the International Legal
Assistance Consortium, all of which have developed reform programmes and
provided actors offering expertise in drafting legislative frameworks.13
While the development assistance these organisations provide demonstrates
exemplary good will, the expanding practice in criminal law reform is indicative
of a trend towards opportunism, noticeable during the post-conflict period,
that is bent on changing the legislative status quo to ensure conformity with
international human rights and due process standards. The critical period
following the immediate cessation of conflict is, according to UN guidance, the
perfect time for international legal advisors to `set virtuous cycles in motion',14
and develop effective criminal law frameworks conducive to establishing the rule
of law.15 If this is indeed the case, it is vital to consider how legal change should
be brought about.
The assumption by the international community of a central role in legisla-
tive reform in these states is a consequence of its custodianship of a new rights
11
Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, National Drug Control Strategy, 18 May 2003, annex, v.
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framework, developed from transformations in human rights law and interna-
tional criminal and humanitarian law since the Second World War, which has
provided international actors with a perceived legitimacy in determining the nor-
mative content of required laws.16 Nevertheless, this legitimacy, and indeed the
legitimacy of international interventions and consequent legislative reform pro-
grammes to establish the rule of law, is likely to be measured against the effec-
tiveness of the laws and frameworks that are subsequently introduced. While the
international interventions of the 1990s and 2000s were ostensibly motivated by
humanitarian and national as well as international security concerns, their le-
gitimacy in the eyes of local populations, judged against criticisms of invasion,
imperialism and colonialism, can be dependent on the success of resulting new
legislative reform that promotes the rule of law.
Any legitimacy risks being seriously undermined when mistakes are made.
Delays by the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK ) in identifying an acceptable
body of criminal law have been criticised for leading to violations of human
rights norms and impairment to the credibility and legitimacy of international
efforts to promote the rule of law in Kosovo.17 Care is needed in contemplating
how criminal law reform should properly be conducted and received by local
populations, requiring reflection on the most effective means of promoting legal
change.
Recycling pre-existing criminal law may be an attractive solution. It is
cost-efficient and may enhance much-needed legitimacy for a new government
amongst the local population during difficult periods of transition and change.18
Difficulties can be encountered, however, when identifying existing criminal
law, leading to confusion in application, a problem encountered in Afghanistan
following 23 years of civil war and the destruction of legal texts by the Taliban
regime. It may also be problematic locating suitable criminal codes capable of
local acceptance. UNMIK's stipulation that the Serbian Criminal Code was to
be applied in Kosovo was rejected by the Kosovar judiciary. In East Timor, the
Timorese were dissatisfied with UNTAET's insistence on applying pre-existing
16
K Boon, `Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post Bellum and the Contemporary
Occupant's Law-Making Powers' (2005) 50McGill LJ 285, 299.
17
W S Betts, S N Carlson & G Gisvold, `The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo
and the Lessons Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law' (2000–1) 22Michigan
JIL 371, 375.
18
R Z Sannerholm, In Search of a User Manual: Promoting the Rule of Law in Unruly Lands (2007).
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Indonesian law.19 Applicable lawmay also be completely inadequate for domestic
requirements, as was the case in Cambodia where the criminal law at the time
of the establishment of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
consisted of only one decree containing 12 brief articles.20
Legal transplants may offer an alternative solution.21 International experts
have supported the transplantation of criminal law in the early stages of post-
conflict reform,22 and the UN has recommended the development of interim
criminal codes for temporary application in generic post-conflict environments
pending further reform.23 Transplanting law, moreover, may help to meet the
requirements placed on occupying powers by Articles 43 and 64 of the Hague
and Geneva Conventions to scrutinise and, if necessary, modify the legislation
of occupied territories. Yet legal development involving the transplantation of
foreign-designed law has also been criticised for embracing a technocratic `one
size fits all' policy that fails to sufficiently take into account important local legal
traditions and socio-political influences.24 The controversy surrounding the use
of legal transplants reflects a lack of certainty amongst the actors taking part in
post-conflict reconstruction about their role in reform. This is epitomised in the
contrasting recommendations of the 2000 UN Brahimi Report and the Rule of
Law report published only four years later. While the former confidently advo-
cated dependence on `foreign models and foreign-conceived solutions,' the latter
cautioned reformers to `eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and the importation of
foreign models.'
19
VO'Connor, `Rule of Law and Human Rights Protections through Criminal Law Reform: Model
Codes for Post-Conflict Criminal Justice' (2006) 13(4) International Peacekeeping 517, 523.
20
D A Donovan, `Cambodia: Building a Legal System from Scratch' (1993) 27 The International
Lawyer 445, 448.
21
I employ the term legal transplant as a metaphor for the act of creating by means of borrowing,
adopting, copying or imposing a legal institution, rule, law or legal norm established in one
country and transplanting it into the legal system of another country. I use thewords `implanting',
`importing', `borrowing', `adoption', and `legal transplantation' to refer to the same phenomenon.
For terminology generally see E MWise, `The Transplant of Legal Patterns' (1990) 38 Am J Comp
L (Supplement) 1.
22
J Dobbins, S G Jones, K Crane & B C De Grasse, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building (2007)
77–9.
23
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question
of Peacekeeping Operations in All Its Aspects (`Brahimi Report') UN Doc A/55/305–S/2000/809
(21 August 2000), para 83. This advice supported the development of the Model Codes for
Post Conflict Criminal Justice, a set of template criminal codes for legislative inspiration and
transplantation.
24
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In spite of all the numerous attempts by international organisations to
promote the rule of law and develop new legal frameworks since the 1990s, there
remains insufficient knowledge and understanding about how legal change can
effectively be facilitated.25 If international actors are drafting new laws to revise
the criminal legal frameworks of states seeking to emerge from conflict as part of
a general rule of law promotion agenda, they must consider how legal change can
most effectively be achieved and, to that extent, whether there is any justification
for adopting legal transplants.
This article considers this issue—transplant justification—in the context of
post-conflict criminal law reform. It reviews the contribution of legal transplants
to this field of law and the rationale for adopting them. It also examines academic
literature on legal transplant feasibility and their limitations as tools for legal
development. It finds that the motivational pull of legal transplants and their
historical popularity provide justification for employing them as mechanisms
for promoting legal change. It suggests that this justification is, nevertheless,
dependent on the potential for any proposed transplanted law being successful,
requiring clarity on the conditions for its success. Following a review of
theoretical perspectives on the determinants of successful transplantation and
the experience of previous criminal law transplants, this article concludes by
proposing an evaluative test to determine the prospects of successful transplant
reception and therefore the justification for employing the transplant mechanism
to develop criminal law in post-conflict states.
2 Legal Transplants and Criminal Law
Following an examination of the transplantation of criminal evidence law from
Anglo-American to continental jurisdictions, Mirjan Damaska concluded that `in
seeking inspiration for change, it is perhaps natural for lawyers to go browsing
in a foreign law boutique.'26 Legislators, it appears, frequently turn to legal
transplants to solve legislative difficulties when creating new law. This is evident
from the contribution of legal transplants to legal development across many legal
disciplines and jurisdictions, including criminal law. The remarkable influence
of the Napoleonic Code d'Instruction Criminelle (CIC) illustrates the power of the
25
K Samuels, Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries. Operational Initiatives and
Lessons Learnt (2006). Available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/Re-
sources/WP37_web.pdf> 3. [accessed 23 April 2014]
26
M Damaska, `The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental
Experiments' (1997) 45 Am J Comp L 839, 852.
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legal transplant phenomenon as an instigator for legal development in this field.27
Within 60 years of its passage in 1808, versions of it were transplanted into most
of the criminal jurisdictions of continental Europe and it has served as a pervasive
precedent for criminal justice reform around the world.28 The Italian criminal
codes of 1808 and 1848 were heavily influenced by it, as were codes in Prussia
in 1851, Russia in 1864 and Holland in 1867.29 Beyond Europe, its provisions
were borrowed by Japan in 1882,30 and it was a significant influence on criminal
procedural reform during the 19th and 20th centuries in a number of Muslim
countries.31
Legal transplants have also been employed as mechanisms to reform inquisi-
torial criminal justice systems by introducing adversarial procedures. In a wave
of post-revolutionary liberal idealism inspired by the French Revolution, a host of
countries with inquisitorial traditions transplanted adversarial procedures dur-
ing the 19th century in order to introduce jury trials based on the English trial
system into their own criminal systems. Jury trials were imported into French
criminal procedure in 1789, and imported into Spain in 1820, Portugal in 1830,
Germany in 1848, Italy in 1860 and Russia in 1864. In the 20th century, they were
re-introduced by means of legal transplantation in Russia in 1991 following con-
siderable US influence, and in Spain in 1995 where the Anglo-American model
was adopted.32 Italy also radically reformed its inquisitorial system by adopt-
ing significant adversarial procedures based on the Anglo-American model in its
1989 Code of Criminal Procedure.33 Similarly, Russia's Criminal Procedure Code
2001 borrowed models from western Europe and the United States,34 and incor-
porated Italy's plea-bargaining procedures.35 In addition, a number of eastern
27
R Vogler, A World View of Criminal Justice (2005) 59.
28
Ibid, 58–9.
29
Ibid.
30
A Watson, `Legal Transplants and Law Reform' (1976) 92 LQR 79, 82.
31
The Ottoman Empire introduced a Penal Code in 1858 based on the CIC and a later procedural
Code (1879) represented a translation of the French code. Persia's 1912 Criminal Code was also
based on the CIC and Egypt's first criminal code (1882) was similarly dependent on it: see Vogler,
above n 27, 115–18.
32
Ibid, 233–53.
33
L Marafioti, `Italian Criminal Procedure: A System Caught Between Two Legal Traditions',
in J Jackson, M Langer & P Tillers (eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and
International Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Damaska (2008) 81.
34
See generally LOrland, `A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002Criminal Procedure Code' (2002)
18 Connecticut JIL 133.
35
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European countries have instigated or are currently in the process of undertaking
similar reforms of their procedural codes to adopt adversarial procedures. Croa-
tia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova and Georgia have all recently transplanted
adversarial trial elements into their criminal procedures.36 Similar criminal pro-
cedure `revolutions' have taken place in several Latin American jurisdictions over
the last 20 years, assisted by legal transplantation. In 2003, Jonathan Hafetz es-
timated that 80 per cent of Latin American countries were involved in criminal
procedure reform to replace their inquisitorial systems with adversarial ones.37
New criminal codes importing Anglo-American adversarial procedures by trans-
plantation were introduced, for example, in Venezuela in 1998–1999, Chile in
2000, Ecuador and Bolivia in 2001 and Nicaragua and Honduras in 2002.38
Transplantation has also been prevalent in the context of criminal justice
reform in post-conflict states, most recently in Afghanistan. The 98 articles
of Interim Criminal Procedure Code 2004 (ICPC), for example, were largely
sourced from the Italian Criminal Procedure Code 1988 and the provisions of
both the 2003 and 2005 Counter Narcotics Laws were transplanted from UN
`model' laws. Moreover, Model Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice have
been developed,39 comprising a compendium of draft laws and procedures for
key elements of the criminal justice system—the courts, police and prisons—that
are available for immediate transplantation in post-intervention states. This is
an innovation that suggests that the way forward for criminal law reform in these
environments is the transplantation of readily available foreign-designed codes.40
36
D Krapac, `Some Trends in Continental Criminal Procedure in Transition Countries of
South-Eastern Europe', in Jackson, Langer & Tillers (eds), Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a
Comparative and International Context (2008) 119, 134; C Alkon, `Plea Bargaining as a Legal
Transplant: A Good Idea for Troubled Criminal Justice Systems?' (2010) 19 Transnational Law
and Contemporary Problems 355, 371.
37
J Hafetz, `Pretrial Detention, Human Rights, and Judicial Reform in Latin America' (2003) 26
Fordham ILJ1754, 1754–5.
38
Vogler, above n 27, 172.
39
The Codes were developed from a project spearheaded by the United States Institute of Peace
(USIP) and the Irish Centre for Human Rights in cooperation with the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the UNODC. They are divided between three volumes:
volume I consists of a draft penal code, the Model Criminal Code; volume II a draft procedure
code, the Model Code of Criminal Procedure; and volume III, the Model Detention Code and
the Model Police Powers Act. The criminal procedure code contains more than 225 articles
covering a range of issues from the investigation of crimes to trial and appeal proceedings as
well as additional matters such as witness protection. See Stromseth, Wippman & Brooks, above
n 6, 198.
40
V O'Connor, `Traversing the Rocky Road of Law Reform in Conflict and Post Conflict States:
Transplants in Post-Conflict Criminal Law Reform 389
Legal transplants are indeed popular tools for developing criminal law. But
their prevalence alone cannot fully explain why international actors engaged in
post-conflict criminal law reform might have a `natural' professional inclination
for relying on them. There must be cogent reasons for their deciding to conduct
reform in this way.
3 Motivations for Transplanting Law
Prestige, cost-saving, international harmonisation and modernisation are all
important motivations for relying on legal transplants to develop law. According
to Alan Watson, the motivation for borrowing foreign law—and indeed the
prospects of the transplant being successful—is related to the degree of prestige
that the new law carries.41 The prestige attached to a foreign import can satisfy
that demand and the authority of a new law is less likely to be questioned if it has
been borrowed from a foreign country where it has been successfully applied.42
In a similar vein, Watson has argued that transplanted law enhances the authority
of those who administer it.43 The authority enhancing effect of transplanted
law is a significant motivation for the borrowing of law. Michele Graziadei
notes the influence of prestige on the recent adoption of German criminal law
thinking among US scholars and concludes that `prestige motivates imitation.'44
The prestige attached to a law, which may relate to the particular legal system
fromwhich it derives,45 or to the perceived global importance of the law, provides
it with the vital ingredient of legitimacy.46
There are, in addition, `cost-saving'motivations for transplanting foreign law.
They represent cheap and easy solutions to legislative problems that have oc-
curred elsewhere. Legal transplants were notably welcomed as representing `an
easy, fast and cheap fix' during the optimism of the law and development move-
Model Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice As A Tool Of Assistance' (2005) 16 Criminal Law
Forum 231, 247–55.
41
See generally A Watson, `Aspects of Reception of Law' (1996) 44 Am J Comp L 335.
42
H Kanda & C Milhaupt, `Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in
Japanese Corporate Law' (2003) 51 Am J Comp L 889, 890–1.
43
Watson, above n 41, 335.
44
M Graziadei, `Transplants and Receptions', in Jackson, Langer & Tillers, above n 33, 458.
45
R Sacco, `Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment II of II)' (1991)
39 Am J Comp L 343, 398–9.
46
J deLisle, `Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American legal Models and Legal
Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond' (1999) 20 U Pa J Int'l Econ L 179, 280–1.
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ment in the 1970s.47 In the context of post-conflict criminal law reform, where
there is often an urgent requirement for new legislation, their practical utility
makes them attractive as means of quickly developing law. This motivation was
acknowledged in the UN Brahimi Report in its recommendation for readily-
available interim criminal code templates for deployment by `quick response' le-
gal teams.48 According to the Report, the application of an off-the-shelf `interim
legal code to which mission personnel could have been pre-trained' would have
been beneficial to peacekeepers in Kosovo and East Timor.49 Afghanistan's trans-
planted ICPC was drafted in a short period of time in response to recommen-
dations in international reports in 2003 that the procedural code required ur-
gent reform.50 Similarly, the 2005 CNLwas prepared quickly with minimal local
consultation to provide measures considered essential to counter the rapidly ex-
panding illicit drug trade. According to a former Head of the UK Rule of Law
team based in Afghanistan, the law was necessary `in order to deal with the drugs
problem, which was an immediate threat to security and stability in the country.
Something needed to be fast-tracked in order to allow that to happen.'51
Globalisation is also a significant motivational force for post-intervention
criminal law transplants. Just as globalisation facilitates the expansion of
transnational crime such as drug trafficking, at the same time it can guide the
development of legislative processes to tackle it. Post-intervention states lacking
suitable preventative law risk becoming safe havens for organised criminal and
terrorist activity. The content of new law created to counter threats of this nature
can be steered by the requirements of multilateral conventions, instruments and
bilateral treaties that promote legislative similarity between signatory countries
to enhance international co-operation in the investigation and prosecution of
transnational criminal activity. The consequent drive for global legislative
uniformity can be usefully accommodated by legal transplantation.
In addition, outdated laws in post-intervention statesmay need to be replaced
by more `modern' legislation equipped with tools to deal with contemporary
criminal realities. UNTAC drafted a new criminal law for Cambodia, enacted
by the Supreme National Council in 1992, to replace inadequate domestic
47
L Nader, The Life of the Law: Anthropological Projects (2002), 48.
48
Brahimi Report, above n 23, para 83.
49
Ibid, para 81. See also M Plunkett, `Re-establishing Law and Order in Peace-Maintenance', in J
Chopra (ed), The Politics of Peace Maintenance (1998) 69.
50
Amnesty International, Afghanistan: Re-establishing the Rule of Law (14 August 2003). Available at:
<www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ASA11/021/2003> para 7.5. [accessed 23 April 2014]
51
Interview, senior member of the UK Rule of Law team, 29 February 2008.
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legislation.52 Bosnian criminal law lacked definitions for relevant crimes, such as
corruption and money laundering, and failed to provide mechanisms to restrict
these activities, such as the confiscation of profits, necessitating legal changes by
a new criminal procedural code.53 Afghanistan's ICPC replaced a code that was
nearly 40 years old and was designed, according to its drafter, to ensure that the
country's criminal procedure system could be aligned `with those of advanced
democratic countries'.54 In a similar manner, Afghanistan's CNL was designed
to introduce modern investigative procedures into Afghanistan's criminal law
framework in order to tackle increasingly sophisticated illicit drug production
and trafficking.55
Whether prestige, cost-saving, globalisation ormodernisation are implicated,
one of the key objectives of employing legal transplants to facilitate criminal
law reform in conflict states has been the necessity of ensuring compliance
with international due process and human rights standards. The development
since WWII of areas such as international criminal law, transitional justice and
human rights law has created a globally recognised rights framework which
influences the normative content of new domestic criminal law. New law must
be consistent with internationally approved fair trial standards, such as those
provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
This can be realised by transplanting provisions from foreign laws that already
conform to these requirements.56 In East Timor, the UNTAET revoked sections
of the existing Indonesian Criminal Code in 1991 that failed to comply with
international human rights standards and later promulgated a more appropriate
criminal law into which were transplanted provisions in tune with international
human rights expectations.57 Similarly, in addition to modernising Cambodia's
criminal justice system by providing new rules for detention, substantive law
and procedure, UNTAC's new 1992 criminal code ensured the protection of
citizens' human rights.58 Moreover, the ICPC was designed to provide a uniform
criminal procedure for Afghanistan and at the same time guarantee compliance
52
O'Connor, above n 19, 523.
53
Call, above n 12, 250–3.
54
IDLO, Criminal Law and Procedure in Afghanistan: Focus on Gender Issues (2007). Available
at: <http://afghantranslation.checchiconsulting.com/documents/training/GenderAndCrimi-
nalJusticeTrainingMaterials_Dari_.pdf> [accessed 23 April 2014]
55
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Counter Narcotics Drug Law [Afghanistan] 17 December 2005.
Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4c1f343b2.html> [accessed 23 April 2014]
56
Boon, above n 16, 299.
57
UNTAET Regulation no. 2000/30; O'Connor, above n 40, 240.
58
O'Connor, above n 19, 524.
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with its international legal and human rights obligations. The development of
these laws was facilitated by the adoption of legal transplants, highlighting their
motivational attraction to legislators intent on ensuring that new criminal law
in post-intervention states complies with international human rights and due
process standards.
The variety of reasons why legal transplants are attractive mechanisms for
legal development and the historical frequency with which they have been re-
sponsible for developing new criminal law would suggest that there is every jus-
tification for considering adopting them to promote legal change in post-conflict
environments. Yet academic commentators on legal transplants have been un-
able to reach any universal agreement on their value for legal development. While
this might appear to be anything but helpful when examining transplant justifica-
tion, in fact the various theoretical perspectives on transplant feasibility provide
useful insights on the legitimacy and constraints of legal transplants and require
review.59 After all, if legal transplants can be adjudged to be valueless or even
unfeasible tools for legal change, there is perhaps no justification for employing
them at all.
4 Theoretical Perspectives on Legal Transplants as
Tools for Legal Change
Much of the academic literature on legal transplants has been concerned with
the association between a transplanted law and its importing and exporting
environments. To a large extent, disagreements over the existence and feasibility
of legal transplants have reflected conflicting perspectives over the relationship
between law and the society in which it exists.60
Watson's controversial theory on legal transplants represents one extreme.
His historical analysis of legal development and the prevalence of legal transplan-
tation as amechanism for promoting legislative change leads him to conclude that
there is only a tenuous relationship between law and the society in which it op-
erates, the significance of which is at best limited.61 The recipient system simply
`does not require any real knowledge of the social, economic, geographical and
59
See generally H Xanthaki, `Legal Transplants in Legislation: Defusing the Trap' (2008) 57 ICLQ
659.
60
Kanda and Milhaupt, above n 42, 889.
61
W Ewald, `Comparative Jurisprudence: The Logic of Legal Transplants' (1995) 43 Am J Comp L
489, 491.
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political context of the origin and growth of the original rule'.62 Law, for Watson,
consists of prepositional statements and rules which have an autonomous exis-
tence separate from environmental concerns, affording them a nomadic charac-
ter that enables them to be easily transplanted from one jurisdiction to another.
Indeed, the many examples of successful borrowing and transplantation of legal
rules over the course of legal history, rules which have not experienced change in
their new environment, demonstrate the autonomous nature of law and its inde-
pendence from external influences.63 Similarly, rules that might seem deeply en-
trenched in their political context are capable of being successfully transplanted
to countries with quite different socio-political cultures, such as the adoption of
French law into the Japanese Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure in
1882,64 and the adoption of Italian law into post-conflict Afghanistan. The re-
curring advent of legal transplantation, Watson suggests, can be explained by the
prestige that new laws and rules carry. Their architects, and thus the engineers of
legal transplants, are generally elite lawyers, judges and legislators who insulate
law from external influences, thus conspiring to further negate the value of wider
national society to law.65
Pierre Legrand offers a perspective on transplant feasibility entirely at odds
with that proposed by Watson. He asserts that legal rules are so dependent on
the national environment in which they exist that they are incapable of travelling
at all. For Legrand, law cannot be transplanted. Because legal transplants
are `impossible', post-conflict criminal law reformers must find other means of
promoting legal change.66
Several other theories have been proposed on the existence, cause and
relevance of legal transplantation as an explanation for legal development, which
lie somewhere between the opposing views ofWatson and Legrand, each offering
different variations on the key factors that play a part in transplant feasibility.
Most of these positions owe their heritage to Charles Montesquieu who, in the
mid-18th century, declared that:
the political and civil laws of each nation should be so closely
tailored to the people for whom they are made, that it would be pure
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chance [un grand hazard] if the laws of one nation could meet the
needs of another […]67
Montesquieu's interpretation of the development of law has found resonance
among a large number of theoreticians, who contend that law corresponds with
societal features or is an expression of social interests or needs.68 Its growth and
development, therefore, are dependent on any number of physical, cultural and
political ingredients unique to the particular society it serves.69
Socio-legal theoreticians of this persuasion have a shared perception of
law, not as a Watsonian autonomous entity, but as something that is relative,
moulded by the society that it serves and by various itinerant features of that
society. Law is bound so closely to its habitat by a potent mixture of physical,
sociological, cultural and economic forces that it can rarely have validity in any
other environment.70
This interdependence between law and society can, it would seem, make the
adoption of foreign law problematic. While law may travel, the processes that
foster and enable the trip are complicated and multifarious and dependent on
stimuli that are more relevant than legal transplants alone for motivating and
shaping legal change, such as society, culture, economy,71 politics and power.72
Context is everything for legal development.73
What of Watson's stance on legal change? He advocates that the legal
transplant is the one device that accounts for legal development. For Watson,
there is every justification for developing post-conflict criminal law by resorting
to legal transplants. That is how law develops. The baggage that might be
known as `societal influences' and `local context' are largely inconsequential and
can be discarded. This suggests that the post-conflict environment where the
local economy may have collapsed, and where human, physical and institutional
infrastructure are often devastated and where the legal system may be subject
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to plural legal traditions is largely an irrelevance in the context of criminal law
reform. Watsonian theory also appears to favour the Brahimi Report's support
of `foreign solutions' for legal development in post-conflict states and the use
of readily-available draft laws from the Model Codes for Post Conflict Criminal
Justice.
Although it is perhaps arguable that Watson's conclusions should only have
application to the field of private law from which he draws most of his data, his
contention that legal transplants are ubiquitous is difficult to rebut. Moreover,
Watson's conviction that the antiquity of legal transplants demonstrates that they
have been a major source of legal development is supported by the experience of
many of the world's criminal justice systems. His work is undeniably useful for
criminal law reformers in post-intervention states in that it at least encourages
them to respect legal transplants as potentially viable promoters of legal change.
WhereWatsonian theory is less useful is that it fails to properly consider what
factors might be important for the successful transplanting of law. For the most
part, Watson is non-committal on this issue.74 He prefers to concentrate on out-
put rather than outcomes and has generally been more concerned with demon-
strating that legal transplants are the primary source of legal development,75 than
with the finer details of what may or may not make them successful sources.76
Ultimately, Watson's message for criminal legal reformers in post-intervention
states would appear to be this: if you are creating new law you are certainly justi-
fied in considering employing legal transplants. In fact, this is how law develops.
If you are also concerned about whether or not the new law will actually succeed,
there is a presumption that it will, based on the experiences of legal history. The
result is a bias towards transplant success and, ultimately, a theoretical stance that
promotes transplant justification but which is fettered by the obvious criticism of
unrealistic prejudice towards the effect and use of the legal transplantmechanism.
If the theories of Watson, Legrand and Montesquieu do not have all the
answers to legal development, where does this leave us on the issue of transplant
justification and post-conflict criminal law? It is perhaps more advantageous to
balance themore constructive features of the various theoretical outlooks on legal
transplantation rather than being concerned with their differences. Evidence
from criminal law reform in post-intervention states and the motivational
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rationale for employing transplants supports Damaska's observation that lawyers
appear to be naturally inclined to transplant law to promote legal change. Indeed,
as Richard Sannerholmmaintains, `[c]harged with the task of supporting criminal
law reform […] [an] international expert would be hard pressed not to look at
models and international benchmarks'.77
It would seem that international actors drafting new law in post-intervention
states are justified in considering using legal transplants to develop law, a position
that positivist approaches such as Watson's would endorse. However, whether it
is realistic for them to go on to do so depends on their potential for successful
reception, an argument that draws on sociological positions that insist that legal
development is inextricably linked to local context. This premise acknowledges
a relationship between law and the society in which it exists. But if transplant
justification is related to transplant evaluation, there needs to be some clarity
on the variables that should be employed in order to measure the successful
reception of a transplanted law.
5 Transplant Evaluation
A number of useful theories have been developed identifying the determinants
for the successful transplantation of law and suggesting ways in which success
can be measured. Otto Kahn-Freund has maintained that successful transplants
can occur but it is the quality of the political relationship between the donating
and recipient countries that determines their success or failure. Some rules which
might have aweak connection to the socio-political structure of the society where
they exist may be easily transplanted, whereas other rules with close connections
to their socio-political environment are less likely to be transplantable.78 Thus,
successful transplantation depends on new rules being put in and/or being taken
from the right socio-political plot.79
Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaupt's views on transplant evaluation also
emphasise the need to find `the right plot'. For them, success is determined by
the `fit' between the adopted rule and the host environment. The nature of the
fit depends on the complimentary relationship between the imported rule and
the existing legal infrastructure in the host country (micro-fit), and between the
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imported rule and existing legal institutions of the political economy in the host
country (macro-fit).
Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard's analysis of
the reception of transplanted law in 49 different countries during the 19th and
early 20th centuries, a particularly useful contribution to the issue of transplant
evaluation, revealed that transplanted law may work successfully if it contains
principles familiar to the local population and if it is capable of adaptation by
local users.80 Legal transplants that develop `internally through a process of trial
and error, innovation and correction, and with the participation and involvement
of users of the law, legal professionals and other interested parties […] tend to be
highly effective.'81 Transplant success is a socio-legal concern and necessitates
the adoption of rules not unfamiliar to the recipient countries that are capable of
further local change.82
The findings of Berkowitz et al resonate with those of Jacque deLisle
following his assessment of the effect of US legal assistance programmes in
former Soviet Bloc countries and China in the 1990s. deLisle concluded that
the successful importation of legal transplants, while tied to their approximation
with the legal culture of the importing country, could be facilitated by close
collaboration between domestic and foreign legal experts, reliance on local
expertise to determine the content of transplanted law and commitment by the
importing country to implement its provisions.83
The conclusions by both Berkowitz et al and deLisle are insightful but
perhaps their use in the context of assessing criminal law legal transplants, which
are the focus of this article, is questionable. The majority of the legal transplants
observed in both studies involved civil and commercial rather than criminal
legislation. This reflects a trend among theories on transplant success and
evaluation. None of the aforementioned theories have derived from evaluations
of criminal law legal transplants, or indeed those connected to the reform
of post-intervention criminal law frameworks. This is potentially significant
because there is an important distinction to be drawn between civil law and
criminal law transplants which may impact on evaluations of their success or
failure. In the former, different forms of procedure, for example, are generally
optional, diverse and not subject to determining international precepts. In
the latter case, however, all transplantation led by international interlocutors
80
D Berkowitz, K Pistor & J-F Richard, `The Transplant Effect' (2003) 51 Am J Comp L 163.
81
Ibid, 189.
82
Ibid.
83
J deLisle, above n 46.
398 John Jupp
is subject to the imperative to respect international human rights norms. The
international human rights framework provides benchmarks for the normative
content of procedural criminal law. The provisions which ensure conformity
with this framework, and with instruments such as the ICCPR, are not negotiable
on `cultural' grounds but are regarded as an absolute necessity irrespective of the
economic, political or sociological environment of the receiving country. To that
extent, if provisions included in transplanted criminal law are consistent with
international human rights and due process standards, it is generally because they
have to be included. There is no legislative choice on this issue. Therefore, it
would be difficult to maintain that they should be judged against measurements
of `efficiency' or `competition' or criticised to the extent that they `find the right
plot', `fit' or have become `unstuck'.
If we are to find a suitable means of evaluating the reception of transplanted
criminal law, including post-intervention criminal law, and understanding the
variables that might contribute to successful and failed reception, it is construc-
tive to reflect on the experience of criminal legal reform that has involved legal
transplantation. This provides further valuable insight into the determinants of
transplant feasibility, useful for developing a suitable evaluative test for trans-
planted law that is designed to reform the criminal law frameworks of conflict
states.
6 Evaluations of Transplanted Criminal Law
Evaluations of the effect of some of the legislation introduced by legal transplants
during various law and development and rule of law promotion movements have
revealed mixed results. The movement that witnessed the exportation of US law
in the 1970s has been condemned by some commentators as a failure.84 Although
driven by well-intentioned US academics and lawyers, it was undermined by
adherence to arrogant assumptions of the effectiveness of laws and legal systems
that were flawed, untested and found ultimately to be unsuitable.85
More recent legislative efforts to promote the rule of law in crisis and post-
conflict societies involving transplanting model templates have been criticised
84
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as being `disappointing',86 their potential for success reduced by a failure to un-
derstand important inter-relationships between law, norms and culture. Using
Kosovo as a case study, Rosa Brooks argues that recent rule of law promotion
efforts in crisis and post-conflict states have been typified by the transplantation
of foreign formal law without proper prior consideration of the relationship in
the recipient country between formal law and cultural norms. Brooks comments
that:
[C]hanges in formal law matter where prevailing cultural norms say
that formal law matters. But when formal law has little resonance
for people, changes in formal law cannot by themselves create new
normative commitments to the rule of law.87
This advice has been borne out with regard to the ICPC in Afghanistan. A
state law based on Italian law and which failed to contain provisions drawing
on procedural rules from Afghanistan's customary or Islamic legal traditions is
largely ignored by legal actors who discretionally apply more historically relevant
customary law and Shari'a to criminal cases.
A number of commentaries on criminal reform involving the transplantation
of unfamiliar foreign models into established procedures have also revealed
disappointing results. Many of these concern the adoption of adversarial
procedures into the inquisitorial criminal justice systems of former Soviet Union
republics. Jason Reichelt suggests that the introduction of plea-bargaining in
the Republic of Georgia was a well-intentioned but ultimately ill-conceived
transplant largely because it did not have a sufficiently equipped defence bar
at the time of the adoption of the new system to render it fair and equitable.88
According to Reichelt, rather than the transplanted procedure achieving the
desired effect of reducing trials, it increased the potential for corruption and
alienated the public against the state justice system.89
A weak defence bar also hampered the successful transplantation of western
European and US adversarial procedures into the Russian Criminal Procedure
Code in 2001. Drawing from lessons from the Russian experience, Richard
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Vogler maintains that the imposition of adversarial and due process norms by
law on its own is unlikely to bring about significant procedural change.90 Cynthia
Alkon reaches similar conclusions with regard to the transplantation of US-style
plea-bargaining into the Moldovan criminal justice system. According to Alkon,
this has amounted to a `transplant failure' because of lack of support for the
procedure by legal professionals.91
Other studies on criminal justice reforms involving transplantation offer
more optimistic appraisals of transplants. Krapac suggests that some of the crimi-
nal law reforms conducted by European countries, notably Croatia, involving the
adoption of adversarial procedures, have been successful. They have resulted in
better human and defence rights protections that meet international standards.92
Davor Krapac also notes that new criminal law in these countries has often been
subject to repeated amendment, indicating that legislators' initial choices of trans-
planted law may not always be realistic and may often be resisted.93 This is sup-
ported by the experience of criminal justice reform in Italy. The 1989 Code of
Criminal Procedure imported significant adversarial features into Italy's inquisi-
torial system, but the model intended by the original reformers has since been
eroded by theConstitutional Court and legislature. The Italian experience under-
lines the difficulties of transplanting procedures from different legal traditions.94
According to Luca Marafioti, `different legal traditions and cultures foster differ-
ent responsibilities within a system, thus encouraging different expectations',95
which may impact on whether or not a transplant is successfully received. Cul-
tural resistance to a transplant may adversely affect the prospects of achieving its
intended outcome.96 The same may be said of a lack of genuine commitment to
reform amongst the legal authorities of the host country responsible for applying
the provisions of any transplanted law introduced to promote legal change.97
Studies have also revealed that the existence (or not) of a culture of legality
in the receiving country is also an important variable which can impact on
transplant feasibility. Nomatter how potentially effective a transplanted criminal
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law may be, its prospects of succeeding is likely to be reduced in societies where
the legitimacy of state law and adherence to state concepts of criminal justice are
weak. The transplantation of laws to promote criminal justice and the rule of
law are less likely to be successful in the absence of a commitment to establishing
these ideals.
What conclusions can be drawn from these examples of transplanted law to
help determine the manner in which legal transplants intended to effect criminal
justice reform in post-intervention states should be evaluated? Some criminal
law transplants have been successful, while others have encountered reception
difficulties, attributable to variables such as the capacity and commitment of le-
gal professionals and the progress of related infrastructural and capacity-building
reform efforts. The concept of success generally emerges, however, as controver-
sial and difficult to measure. It may depend on whose point of view is considered.
An international reformer may regard a law that they have drafted, dependent on
foreign texts, as a success merely because it has been enacted, while a judge apply-
ing it may regard it as a failure. Furthermore, some aspects of transplanted laws
may be successful, while others are not. It is difficult to judge accurately the effect
of any law, let alone transplanted criminal law or the variable that will determine
its success or failure. In this regard it is hard not to sympathise with Grazl's expe-
rience of `the ubiquity of uncertainty during transplantation',98 or to agree with
Beckstrom's observation that `[t]he identification of performance indicators for a
transplanted legal system is a perplexing business as best'.99
While acknowledging this, it is perhaps useful to note that the experience of
legal transplants in the field of criminal law largely confirmsWatsonian optimism
over the significance of the legal transplantation medium for developing law.
They also verify sociological perspectives of the centrality of local environment
to legal development. Ultimately, they confirm the premise that law can develop
by legal transplantation, but that the fundamental issue of whether or not they
will succeed is tied to local contextual concerns. Furthermore, the weight of
academic evidence in this field suggests that the criteria that are adopted for
evaluating the success of any proposed or actual legal transplant must ultimately
be fundamentally related to the environment into which the new law is imported.
The same rule of thumb must apply for assessing legal transplants adopted for
criminal law reform in post-conflict situations. Having said this, it is vital to
98
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acknowledge that problems surrounding the reception of transplanted law in
post-conflict states are likely to be symptomatic of the huge challenges that the
state criminal justice systemmay face at the time of the enactment of the law. The
poor capacity of legal personnel, potentially limited reach of the state system in
countries such as Somalia and Afghanistanwith plural legal traditions, corruption
and insecurity are likely to impact negatively on transplant reception.
Perhaps when international reform and reconstruction efforts have had
more time to `bed-in', these negative effects can be reduced, allowing for better
prospects of successful transplantation. Turkey's transplantation of the Swiss
Civil Code was assessed as being successful, after all, some 25 years after the
legislation was enacted.100 Moreover, at the time of its introduction, Turkey
possessed a generation of well-trained jurists. Typical of post-intervention states,
this was far from being the case in Afghanistan when either new criminal law was
passed between 2004 and 2007. A UNAMA rule of law officer noted in 2007 that:
[W]e are starting at a low point. 40% of judges have no legal training
at all. So it will take time for the new generation to come through. In
many respects the foundations have been laid in terms of education
and it will take time for the newly trained generation of lawyers to
come through and make a difference. It will take at least a decade.101
It is likely that there will be a slower rate of progress in terms of legislative reform
taking root in post-interventionist as opposed to non-conflict states, delaying the
reception of any transplanted laws. According to Samuels:
It is increasingly clear that a realistic timeframe for re-creating a
working criminal justice system following serious armed conflict
with formal courts, trained judges and a retrained police force is
close to twenty-years. This is all the more true where the criminal
justice system was never particularly strong or effective before the
conflict, and it is even worse where new legal norms are sought
to be introduced, or if there is little political will or weak local
constituency support for the reforms.102
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What yardsticks should be adopted for evaluating post conflict criminal law legal
transplants? What emerges from evaluative studies of legal transplants in general
and from the experience of criminal law reform involving legal transplantation is
that local environmentmatters. Success or failure is connected to local contextual
concerns such as local ownership, participation and commitment to reform.
Evaluations of legal transplants in post-intervention states must therefore be
responsive to the idiosyncratic legal requirements of the country concerned at
the time of its introduction and during the course of the evaluation, placed in the
wider context of its legal traditions, cultural considerations and social, economic
and political concerns. While these wider issues must be borne in mind, two key
questions need to be addressed in order to evaluate the success of post-conflict
criminal law legal transplants to assess transplant success. First, to what extent
has the transplanted law been accepted by the local population of the recipient
post-conflict country? And secondly, to what extent has it achieved the objectives
for which it was enacted in the context of the post-conflict situation in which
it was introduced? The greater its acceptance and the degree to which it has
achieved its objectives the more successful it is as a transplanted law.
These two variables balance the socio-legal and positivist perspectives on law
which have permeated academic discourse on legal transplants, the first reflecting
the former and the second the latter. Answering them should help to determine
whether there is any justification for adopting a legal transplant to promote legal
change to a post-conflict criminal law framework. The greater the potential for
the law being accepted and achieving its objectives, the greater the justification
for developing it by adopting transplanted foreign provisions. In addition, the
ongoing application of this test can help to ascertain whether or not there is any
need for further amendment to the law.
A law's `acceptance' can be determined with reference to its application. Ob-
jective performance indicators such as legal detention statistics, prison popula-
tions, and conviction and acquittal rates are informative in this respect if avail-
able and reliable. It is critical also to assess the application of a transplanted law
by local law enforcement agents, judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers. This
tallies with Beckstrom's observation during reform in Ethiopia that `[j]udges and
lawyers practicing new laws are in the front line of the confrontation between
new laws and the nation. The acceptance and effectiveness of the entire legal
order depend in the first instance and for the most part on these men'.103
The acceptance, and application, of a law by local practitioners is likely
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to be heavily influenced by the extent to which they regard it as meaningful
and appropriate for use in their own jurisdiction. According to Berkowitz, if
legislation is to be effective, `it must be meaningful in the context in which it is
applied so citizens have an incentive to use the law'.104 The more meaningful
and appropriate local practitioners consider new legislation to be, the easier they
will find it to understand, engage in and enforce, improving the prospects of its
success. This, therefore, also requires assessment and will be largely conditioned
by the compatibility of the new lawwith the established legal order and traditions
of the host country, underlining the necessity of being sensitive to these variables
prior to the transplantation of any law.
Assessing the extent to which a transplanted law's objectives have been
achieved is also vital to its evaluation. This requires some analysis of the reasons
for the demand for the law and the motivations for relying on the transplant
mechanism to prepare it, which can impact on the achievement of objectives
and therefore transplant success. Transplantation in the arena of post-conflict
criminal law reform can often be motivated by expediency. The criminal
justice systems in these states typically require urgent procedural and substantive
reform. Yet `cost-saving' legal reform involving transplantation may fail to be
sufficiently sensitive to local legal traditions and context. The motivation of
expediency may not guarantee success.
This is also the case with regard to transplants motivated by modernisation.
Legal transplants designed to modernise post-conflict criminal justice systems
often in reality reflect western and more particularly US motivations of promot-
ing stability and combating concerns such as terrorism and international drug
trafficking. This can be translated into legislative reform which, on the one hand,
appears to augment criminal justice reform in conflict states requiring rule of law
assistance, while on the other hand serves western and US foreign policy stabil-
isation interests. The requirement for rule of law reform can motivate US legal
intervention and indeed hegemony, which has been articulated through agen-
cies such as USAID and CEELI that actively promote US interests by dominating
criminal procedure reform. However, it can also lead to reform that involves the
transplantation of foreign-based law without any local participation. This can
cause local resentment leading to the legislation being regarded negatively by lo-
cal populations and politicised as impositions bent on imperialism and expan-
sion. This perception can be increased when it competes with other practices in
a country with plural legal traditions and when law reform is backed by military
104
Berkowitz, above n 80, 167.
Transplants in Post-Conflict Criminal Law Reform 405
force, which is often the case during rule of law promotion programmes in post-
conflict countries, such as that undertaken in Afghanistan. Visible foreign armies
can provide coercive authority for lawmaking, but at the cost of local scepticism
and contempt, which can undermine the ability of transplanted laws to achieve
their objectives. This may well have been the case with the transplanted ICPC
and the CNL in Afghanistan, the reception of which was problematic.
7 Conclusion
The post-conflict period can be an opportune time for promoting legal change,
and criminal law frameworks are often a focus for reform to create functioning
criminal justice systems, paramount for the establishment of the rule of law.
While legal transplants have frequently been employed to develop new criminal
law in post-conflict states, there is uncertainty over the justification for adopting
them. Greater clarity on this issue of transplant justification may provide some
guidance to post-conflict reformers on whether or not legal transplants represent
practical solutions for promoting legal change.
The number and variety of motivational forces for legal transplantation
certainly underline their practical significance and importance as a form of
legal development.105 Moreover, the overwhelming historical evidence that legal
transplants have been responsible for the development of new criminal law for
a considerable period of time in many of the world's criminal justice systems
demonstrates that it is, as Damaska observed, `natural' for legislators to rely
on them, particularly when engaged in the reform of criminal law frameworks
of post-conflict states. Indeed, the ubiquity of legal transplants in the field of
criminal law implies that it would be bad practice not to consider them as vehicles
for developing new law. As Sannerholm maintains, `[c]harged with the task
of supporting criminal law reform […] an international expert would be hard
pressed not to look at models and international benchmarks.'106
While academic literature on legal transplantation reveals fundamental dis-
agreement over transplant existence and feasibility, which reflect differences of
opinion on thewider relationship between law and society, themore constructive
aspects of these conflicting theories suggest that criminal law can certainly be de-
veloped by legal transplantation. This transplant justification is however depen-
dent on the prior application of an evaluative test to determine the prospects of
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successful reception. The weight of evidence from evaluative studies of criminal
law and theoretical assessments of transplant feasibility suggests that the success
or failure of legal transplants will be intimately related to the local contextual
concerns of the receiving countries at the time of their introduction and, sub-
sequently, during their application. Bearing this in mind, evaluations of post-
conflict criminal law should assess the extent to which it is capable of being
accepted and achieving their objectives. This entails examining the manner in
which it will be applied by local practitioners, whether it has the potential to be re-
garded as meaningful and appropriate, the motivations behind its enactment and
whether its objectives can be realised. The more positive the projected outcomes
of the law relative to these criteria, the greater the justification for developing it
by legal transplant.
